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Abstract 
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount
the sustainability of collusion is independent of key demand and supply parameters. Rec
demonstrated that these counterintuitive results stem from the assumption that firms can ch
infinitesimally small increments (i.e., continuously).  This note considers the effects of de
in the context of a model of collusion where, as in Gallice (2008), Bertrand competitors can
lowering prices by some small, discrete amount. Two alternative demand specifications
influence of demand curvature are considered.  In either case, it is shown that with discre
the critical discount factor is determined by the key demand parameters, including de
However, the direct effects of increased concavity (or convexity) in market deman
way in which the respective demand curves rotate in response to a change in 
parameter.  The results support the conclusion of earlier research that determin
collusion in homogeno
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1 Introduction 
sustainable in a discrete-time, infinitely repeated Bertrand-Nash oligopoly 
game (‘supergame’) if  
Collusion is said to be 
2 21 (1 ) ( )M D NN
d d p p d dP + + + ³ + + +  , 
here N  denotes the number of perfectl symmetric firms competing in homog
 the per-period collusive (monopoly) profits,  the one-period profits realized b
[0,1]d
(1) 
 
w y enous products, 
y a given 
 deviating from (‘cheating on’) the collusive agreement,  the per-period Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium profits, and  the rate at which firm ure profits (which is 
med to be identical across fir s).  The above the critical value 
which collusion is sustainable: 
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, for of the discount rate, *d
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P³ = - , (2) 
 
since 
0
1
1
t
t
d d
¥
= = -å  and, by the usual assumption, 0  (i.e., the firm
the one-period non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash game in each punishment period
The traditional industrial organization literature assumes that the cheati
capture all market sales by cutting its price by some infinitesimal amount, i.e., fir
their prices in a continuous fashion.  A counterintuitive implication of this latt
*
Np = s revert to playing 
 ad infinitum).1   
ng firm can 
ms can change 
er assumption is 
that  is unaffected by key demand (e.g., intercept and slope) and supply (i.e., marginal cost) 
parameters that are known to affect the profitability of collusion.  However, an important and 
recent paper by Gallice (2008) assumes homogenous Bertrand competitors can change prices 
 (or non-infinitesimal) increment
                                                
d
(i.e., deviate from the optimal collusive price) only in discrete s.  
 
1 This is the so-called ‘trigger strategy’ developed by Friedman (1971).   
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Under this arguably more plausible assumption, he shows that  is no longer independent of key 
dem 2
on collusion 
pecifications that 
meters) on the 
many 
(empirical) market demand curves are unlikely to be strictly linear, and in fact, some economists 
e exception 
n of demand 
e maps) that are 
com ingh & Vives 
     
It is shown that the curvature of market demand can im rt sizeable effects on the critical 
and 
lar specification of the 
example, in the first 
n the intercept 
 convex’ 
in as the 
 the second 
*d
pa
and or supply parameters.    
This note expands upon Gallice’s framework and adds to the literature 
sustainability in Bertrand supergames by considering more general demand s
capture the effect of demand curvature (in addition to other key demand para
sustainability of collusion.  Considering nonlinear demand curves is warranted since 
have opined that nonlinear demand curves are likely to be the norm rather than th
from a theoretical perspective.3  Furthermore, it has been shown that the derivatio
curves that are linear in prices requires underlying utility functions (indifferenc
plex, e.g., require quadratic orders of the consumption arguments (such as in S
1984), or that contain at least a single point of discontinuity (Alperovich & Weksler 1996). 
discount factor both directly and indirectly (i.e., through its relation to changes in other dem
parameters), although the nature of the relationships depends on the particu
market demand function––two of which are considered in the analysis.   For 
specification an increase in market demand (as affected by a positive change i
parameter) can have no impact on the sustainability of collusion for ‘sufficiently
demand.  It is demonstrated (numerically) that collusion can become easier to susta
demand curve becomes more concave.  However, the opposite result holds under
                                                 
2 Gallice considers two demand specifications, linear and constant-elasticity.  For the la
(numerically) that there is a range over which *d is initially decreasing in the elasticity o
tter case he shows 
f demand but then 
jumps discontinuously to a point where collusion is never sustainable.  Earlier work by Collie (2004), in the 
context of a Cournot model, also shows that collusion becomes easier to sustain the more elastic is market 
demand.  The ensuing discussion relates to the results from Gallice’s linear demand model.       
3 See, e.g., Walters (1980), Formby et al. (1982), and Coughlin (1984).  This body of literature focuses on 
the strong potential for and implications of upward-sloping marginal revenue functions that may arise out 
of convex demand curves.  According to Fomby et al. (1982, p.306): “the possibility of an upward sloping 
marginal revenue function can never safely be assumed away.  Our theoretical analysis lends support to 
A.A. Walter’s [1980] conjecture that the demand conditions [i.e., convexity] leading to upward sloping 
marginal revenue may indeed be pervasive.” (emphasis in original)    
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demand specification.   Thus, exactly how nonlinearity ‘influences’ the demand specification can 
s, somewhat counterintuitive implications for the 
sust
 discusses the two 
ty of demand can 
parameterization of the demand function.  The differences in the results obtained from the two 
 are shown to stem from the effect that changes in the curvature parameters have on 
the rotation of the respective demand schedules.  Section 3 summarizes and offers concluding 
2.1 Demand  
Two specifications of a (potentially ar market demand curve are examined.  The first is 
tini (1996):     
 
[Model I] 
The second is similar in form to that used by Tyagi (1999) and is given by 
 4 (4) 
ept and slope 
The parameters  and  are the respective demand curvature parameters.   
Notice that in Model I only market price is raised to the power of the curvature parameter, while 
                                                
lead to disparate and, in some instance
ainability of collusion.     
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents and
demand specifications considered in the analysis.  It is shown that the concavi
either (directly) increase or decrease the sustainability of collusion depending on the specific 
specifications
remarks. 
 
2 The model 
) nonline
similar to that considered, e.g., by Benson (1980) and Lamber
pca b .           (3) ( )Q p = -
 
( ) ( )Q p p ya b= - .
[Model II] 
 
The parameters a  and b  in either specification denote the strictly positive interc
parameters, respectively, and ( ) 0Q p >  where 0p >  denotes price.   
0c > 0y >
 
4 Benson (1980), Lambertini (1996), and Tyagi (1999) exclusively or primarily consider ‘direct’ demand 
functions wherein price is a function of quantity, as opposed to the ‘inverse’ demand functions considered 
here.  As such, the former papers model firms competing in quantities as opposed to prices.    
 4
in Model II the curvature parameter applies to both the market price and the key demand 
param
ider ide ble downward-
.  Mo ear fo ) it is concave 
el II is linear for , while for e).   
Unlike the cases Gallice (2008) considers, with the demand specification given in equations (3) 
orm solutions.  
unappealing; however, 
  See, e.g., 
ssumed to be 
tically equivalent to 
simply normalizing marginal costs to zero.  Alternatively, the intercept term can simply be 
conceptualized as being measured net of marginal costs (Deneckere 1983). 
2.2 Model I 
First consider the demand curve given by Eq. (3).  Individual demand for firm  is 
eters.   
The curvature parameters can be varied to cons a w range of possi
sloping demand functions del I is lin r 1 , while for 1c >  (cc =
y >
1<
) it is convex (concav1y = 1  ( 1y <(convex).  Mod
2.2 Supply  
and (4) it must be assumed that marginal costs are zero in order to derive closed-f
At first blush the assumption of zero marginal costs may appear somewhat 
it is a common one made in the literature even when not analytically required.
Deneckere (1983) and Rothschild (1992).  Indeed, since marginal costs are a
constant and symmetric across firms in the model, this treatment is analy
 i
( ){ }1 1( ) j ip p
p
q p
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=
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if for any
0 ot erwise
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Under the collusive equilibrium the firms cooperatively set the market price that maximizes total 
industry profits.  Since the firms are symmetric this implies  
p
The joint (collusive) profit-maximization problem is    
h
1 2 Np p p= = = = . 
1
max ( ) ( )
.
p
p pQ p
p pca b +
P =
= -
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The first-order condition (“FOC”) associated with the above problem is  
( 1)p 0ca b c¶P = - + = . 
Solving the FOC for the collusive price yields 
p¶
1/
( 1)M
p b c
caé ù= ê ú+ê úë û , 
where  indexes collusive items or outcomes that are attained at the monopoly equilibrium 
levels.  Each cartel member’s share of the per-period collusive profits equals 
M
( )
.
1 M
N N
N
c a
c
æ ö÷÷ç ÷è ø+
 
Again, if one firm chooses to deviate from the coll greement, then t
deviating firms react by playing the Friedman (1971) non-cooperative (‘grim
the infinite punishm llice, the cheating firm’s deviation from
collusive price (its price undercut) is giv  the small and positive but discrete
M M Mp Q p
p
P =
ç= ÷ç
usive a he other non-
 trigger’) strategy in 
all subsequent periods (so that each firm, including the deviator, earns  in each period of 
ent phase).   Following Ga  the 
en by  increment 
5 which in turn implies .  The firm that deviates fro e cartel therefore 
 set 
firm earns a one-period profit 
0Np =
m th0D > ,
charges price 
of 
D Mp < P
D = -
 a  is
Mp p D  and, for a single period, captures all market sales.  The quantity
by the deviating firm t Dp  given by D Dq p
ca b= - ,  and the 
1
Dp p
cb += - > .D D M Np a P    
Substituting  and  into the incentive constraint given by equation (1) and 
it in term  indicates that collusion is sustainable if  
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s of  
Dp
  and expressing Mp Dp
* ( )11
( )
M M
D D
p p
N p p
c
c
b ad d b a
-³ = - - . (5) 
 
                                                 
5 As in Gallice (2008), it is assumed that the deviation price is in the range of 1-2 percent beneath the 
collusive price.   
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The above expression indicates that, as in Gallice’s model, under the assumption of discrete price 
deviations is a function of the intercept and slope parameters of the demand function.  
 d mined by the curvature of the market demand function since  and 
E leads , if demand is 
ge di ), then the critical discount factor pertaining 
odel obtains (i.e., where 
*d
Furthermore, *d is also eter Mp
Dp  are implicitly defined by c .6   
xamination of equation (5)  to the following intuitive results.  First
linear ( 1c = ) and prices chan scretely (D > 0
 in the latter): to Gallice’s m 0c =
2
*
1, 0
1
( 4 )Nc
ad a b= D> = - - D . 
Second, if demand is l
2 2 2
inear and prices change continuously (regardless of the treatment of 
marginal costs), then the ordinary case in which the critical discount factor is independent of any 
demand factors is obtained: 
2
* 11
N
N
ad a
-= - = . 21, 0 Nc= D
That is, the critical discount factor is ber of 
ability of collusion decreases.  The key parameters of the 
market demand function play no role in determining the sustainability of collusion in this case.
 Now consider how , as given by equation (5), changes with a perturbation in the 
intercept parameter of the market demand curve: 
 
only a function of N , which indicates that as the num
firms in the market increases the sustain
   
*d
*
2 2
( )( (1 ) )
0
( ) ( )
M M D
D D
p p p
N p q
c ca b a b cd
a ac
D - - +¶ = ³¶ - . (6) 
n  effect depends on the sign of , which is not 
immediately apparent.7  However, some simple numerical examples are sufficient to illustrate 
                                                
 (1 )D Dz p
ca b c= - +The sign of the margi al
 
6 Notice that these prices in equation (5) are also raised to the power of the curvature parameter.   
7 Note that Dz  is determined by c  through its scaling of b  as well as through its effect on Dp , which 
itself is raised to the power of c . 
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that it is non-negative.  As such, an outward shift of the demand curve will tend to make collusion 
s will have a greater incentive to deviate and capture the entirety of 
the rket.    
and which 
harder to sustain since all firm
larger ma
Consider { 100a = ; 50b = ; 0.01D = 10 } 0.01 } (
corresponds to a highly convex market demand curve).  Then 0Dz =  and 
; N = {c =
*d¶ ¶
an increase in the size of the m no effect on the sustainability of collusion.  Keeping a
parameter values the same bu 1000=  (which corresponds to a highly co
D
0a =  –– i.e., 
ll 
ncave demand 
curve) results in 
arket has 
t setting 
; clearly 
c
100z = * 0d a¶ ¶ >  in this case.8  Other examples can be shown to 
nstrate that, ceteris paribus, an outward shift of the demand curve will have a greater 
(sm re concave (convex) the market demand 
curve.    
Turning to the slope parameter , it can be shown that 
demo
aller) effect on the critical discount factor the mo
b
 
* *
0
d a d
b b a
¶ ¶= - £¶ ¶ . 
This result also mirrors Gallice (2008).
(7) 
 coefficient of the 
marke f how the curvature 
a e in  will affect the critical discount factor are 
straightforward given that the sign of equation (7) ply the negative of equation (6) times 
.  As the demand curve becomes relativel re concave a marginal change in 
.  
sion is increasing in ––a lower deviation 
price effectively lowers the opportunity cost of cheating.   This same result and the intuition 
                                                
9  All else equal, an increase in the slope
t demand function makes collusion easier to sustain. The implications o
of demand will affect the extent to which a ch ng  b
 is sim
y mo
 d
/ 0a b > b  
*results in a proportionally smaller (negative) change in
 Gallice finds that the sustainability of collu  D
 
8 Recognize that 0lim 0Dzc =  and lim Dzc a¥ = , which are the fundamental results that 
underscore the relationship between the curvature of the market demand function and the impact of a 
change in demand on the critical discount factor.    
9 Gallice shows that changes in the slope parameter affect the sustainability of collusion through their 
impact on the intercept term of the inverse market demand curve.    
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behind it are also borne out in the present context. The effect of a marginal change in the price 
tick on the critical discount factor is given by 
 
* *
0
d ac d
a
¶ ¶= - £¶D D ¶ . (8) 
 
Thus, the greater the spread between the collusive and deviation prices the easier it is to sustain 
demand curve becomes more concave.  This result holds since a higher  raises both the 
 as well
collusion.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the (negative) marginal effect rises as the market 
parenthetical expression given in equation 
c
(8)  as *d a¶ ¶ , as discussed above.   
 It is also possible to consider the direct effect of a change in demand curva
on the critical discount factor under the assumption of discrete price changes, wh
ture in Model I 
ich is given by 
 
2
*
2 2
1
{ ln( ) [ ( )( (1 )
(1 )
( ){( )( ) ( ) } ln
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( (1 ) ln( ))]}
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b p ac a b c cc c
ac abc b c
bc ac c c
d
c
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e sign of equation 
otentially) positive and negative terms that interrelate 
add
 However, a numerical example is sufficient to demonstrate that the sign of equation (9) is 
negative, which implies that as demand becomes increasingly concave the sustainability of 
collusion increases (albeit at a decreasing rate).  Again, consider the parameter values 0
.  Figures 1.a and 1.b graph  and 
D D
where (1 )M Mz p
ca b c= - +  (which, like Dz , is strictly non-negative).   Th
(9) is not apparent due to the various (p
itively or multiplicatively in the numerator.   
{ 10a = ; 
50b = ; 0.01D = ; 10}N = *d *d c¶ ¶  , respectively
 to vary over the range .   
Figure 1.a clearly shows that the slope of  monotonically decreases over the relevant 
range of .  Figure 1.b shows that the rate of change in the partial derivative falls the higher the 
, at 
these values while allowing c [0.000 10 000]1,
*d
c
 9
* 0d c¶ ¶ =value of the slope parameter, approaching a horizontal asymptote at .  Therefore, 
llusion eas , the magnitude 
rve.   
 For instance, 
Hay able for modeling demand 
itch to the 
ld be 
increasing in the concavit and (i.e., hinder the sustainability of collusion) since 
 high 
ith respect to a 
el
  why the same 
e e between the 
deviation profits and the collusive profi  would have otherwise obtained in 
each one-shot (or single-pe .   Figure 2 presents the 
 (indicating that 
devi  as 
relative 
             
2.3 Model II 
 given by equation (4) is  
 
with the FOC: 
                                                
while a marginal increase in c  unambiguously make co ier to sustain
of the effect is smaller the higher the (initial) concavity of the market demand cu
Arguably, these results may appear somewhat counterintuitive. 
rapetyan et al. (2007) note that: “A concave demand curve is applic
for a service with a comparable alternative (at a high enough price all users will sw
alternate service).”  One might therefore expect, a priori, that the critical discount factor wou
consumers could more readily substitute towards alternative goods/services at sufficiently
prices.  Indeed, this is precisely the result obtained by Lambertini (1996, p. 332) w
homogenous Cournot mod
y of dem
.10   
fine 
riod) gam
However, in the present context it is straightforward to demonstrate
intuition does not apply.  D , or the differenc
graph of this function for the above parameter values.  Notice >
ation profits are monotonically increasing in demand curvature) while / 0p¶
c  ¥ .   Thus, the more concave the market demand curve of Model I the lowe
( ) ( / ) 0D M Np c p p= - >
ts that the cheating firm
e over the range [0c Î
plies that collusion will 
.0001,10 000]
that p c¶ ¶
be easier to sustain as 
/ 0
c
c¶ 
r the 
 increases.gain from cheating, which im
The collusive profit-maximization problem for the demand specification
max ( ) ( )
p
p p p ya bP = - , 
 
10 Lambertini (1996) takes the ation quantity set by the cheating firm as set under the assumption that 
each of the non-deviating firm ntinues to produce its joint profit-maximizing output level.    
devi
s co
 10
1( ) ( ) ( ) 0
p
Q p p p
p
yb a b - +¶P = - - =¶ .  
 
The equilibrium collusive and deviation prices are given by 
 
(1 )
(1 )
,
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M
D
p
a=
p
b y
a b y
b y
+
- D += +
 
 profits 
 
respectively, with the associated equilibrium
1
,
(1 )
( (1
1 .
(1 )
M
D
y
y
aya y
b y
ayb a by
b y
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø+P = +
æ ö÷ç D + - D +÷ç ÷è ø+P = +
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Plugging the latter two expressions into equation (2) gives the collusion sustainability condition: 
 * 1 11
( (1 ))N a b y- D +
Equation 
yaya by yd d
æ ö æ÷ç ç D÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷è ø è ø+ +³ = -  (10) 
 
es the critical 
demand.  
Again, the sustainability of collusion is decreasing in the size of the market under this fram rk: 
 
yay -ö÷+
(10) also indicates that under the assumption of discrete price chang
discount factor is a function of key demand parameters, including the curvature of 
ewo
2 2 2 (1 )
*
2
(1 ) ( )
1 1
0
( (1 ))N
yay ayb y bd y y
a a b y
- +æ ö÷çD + D +÷ç ÷è ø¶ + += >¶ - D + .
11 (11) 
 
The comparative statics results with respect to the slope and price-tick param s are 
qualitatively similar to those found in Model I:  
                                                
eter
 
11 Note that for /D M NP > P  it must be the case that (1 ) 0a b y- D + > , and as such, equations (11)-
(12)  hold as a strict inequalities.   
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0
0.
d a d
b b a
d da a¶
¶ ¶
¶ 
= - <¶
¶ ¶= - D <¶D
 (12) 
 
 Now consider the direct effect of demand curvature, which is given by  
 
 
(1 )
*
2
( )( ) ( (1 )
1 1
( (1 )(ln( ) ln( )))
1 1
( (1 ))N
yay ay - +æ b ab yy y
ay aya b y bd y y
c y a b y
ö÷ç D + + ÷ç ÷+ +ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç+ - D + - D + ÷ç ÷çè ø¶ + += -¶ - D + . (13) 
 
f the numerator 
eter val s 
ctor diminishes 
(rises)––the exact opposite of the result obtained from Model I.  Thus, Model II generates the 
seemingly more ‘intuitive’ result that ––to the extent concavity reflects substitution options (i.e., 
is more difficult to sustain the more easily 
con
 which to 
revious studies), 
the question remains why the corresponding results are so similar with respect to the (indirect) 
effects of perturbations in the demand parameters, but diametrically in opposition with respect to 
the (direct) effect of demand curvature.  The economic intuition for the latter stems from the way 
in which the respective (direct) demand specifications rotate about their intercepts in  space 
in response to a perturbation in the relevant curvature parameter.   
For Model I, a ceteris paribus increase in the curvature parameter  results in the market 
demand curve rotating inwards about its horizontal (quantity) intercept (i.e. ).  That is, as this 
demand curve becomes more concave it also rotates inwards, which (all else equal) results in a 
Again, numerical simulations must be used in order to gain insight into the sign o
in equation (13).   Figure 3 graphs equation (13) for the param ue
10 0.01 } where y  varies over the interval [0.01,100] .   In this case
demand curve becomes relatively more convex (concave), the critical discount fa
at least at the higher range of market price)––collusion 
{ 100a =
, as
; 50b = ; 
 the market N = ; D =
sumers can switch to alternatives besides the cartel’s output.     
 Given that both Models I and II appear to be reasonable specifications in
capture the influence of demand curvature (and, again, both have been used in p
( , )p q
c
, a
 12
lower deviation price relative to the collusive price at any given level of output, hence making 
collusion easier to sustain.12  On the other hand, in Model II an increase in , which makes the 
 curve about its 
 convexity of 
r price that a firm 
s collusion easier 
stain.13     
 
3 Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper considers the effect of demand curvature on the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand 
ercutting in 
ameterized, a 
ustainability of 
collusion.  The empirical literature on cartel duration generally market 
 not be the case 
rall, the results 
uantity-setting 
r firms in more 
  
                                                
y
 finds that an increase in 
market demand curve relatively more convex, results an upward rotation of the
vertical (price) intercept.  Thus, all else equal, at any given level of price, greater
demand is associated with a higher level of output and, correspondingly, a lowe
could obtain from deviating.  Therefore, increasing convexity in this case make
to sustain; conversely, more concave demand makes collusion more difficult to su
supergames in which firms can only deviate from the optimum cartel price by und
small, discrete increments.  Depending on how the market demand curve is par
change in demand curvature can have very different direct implications for the s
demand tends to hinder collusion (Levenstein & Suslow 2006), although this need
under the demand specification in Model I and sufficiently convex demand.  Ove
support Tyagi’s (1999, p. 298) conclusion (drawn in the context of a repeated q
game) that: “[W]ithout doing a case-by-case analysis, it is difficult to say whethe
homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude.”     
 
 
12 This inward rotation of the Model I market demand curve is what also drives the c ncavity of p .   
13 It is important to keep in mind that these results arise because of the assumption discrete price changes 
in the pricing supergame, which it turn results in the critical discount factor being a function of the 
respective curvature parameters.   
o
of 
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 FIGURE 2:  THE EFFECT OF  ON  FOR  AND 
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FIGURE 3:  THE EFFECT OF  ON  FOR  AND 
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